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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),1
commonly but imprecisely referred to as “Superfund,”2 for the
dual purposes of promoting “timely cleanup of hazardous waste
sites, and to ensure that the costs of such cleanup efforts were
borne by those responsible for the contamination.”3 Conversely,
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act4 to, among other things,
“protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources
so as to promote the public health”5 and encourage “the
development and operation of regional air pollution prevention
and control programs.”6 Thus, CERCLA generally provides for
the cleanup of land and water at sites that have already been
contaminated to such a degree that they pose a threat to
human health or the environment, while the Clean Air Act
regulates ongoing emissions for the purpose of improving or
maintaining ambient air quality. Because the two laws have
very different aims and are implemented differently, judicial

1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012).
2. The term “Superfund” more precisely refers to the trust fund created by CERCLA
that the Environmental Protection Agency can use to clean up contaminated sites and
pursue contributions from responsible parties. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (2015).
3. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States (Burlington Northern), 556
U.S. 599, 602 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).
4. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401–7671q (2012).
5. Id. § 7401(b)(1).
6. Id. § 7401(b)(4).

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol6/iss1/7

2

Cioffi: Filling Holes in the Air: Why the Ninth Circuit in <i>Pakootas v.

30

WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 6:1

decisions that do not properly account for these differences
could open a hole in coverage where one did not previously
exist. Specifically, recent court decisions narrowly interpreting
the key CERCLA terms “arrange” and “disposal,”7 if construed
too broadly, could render entities that aerially emit hazardous
substances that contaminate a site immune from liability. This
potential hole in coverage could result in the failure to clean up
contaminated sites, threatening human health and the
environment, and in taxpayers or other innocent parties
paying for the cleanup—either result would frustrate
congressional intent.
Two cases in the Ninth Circuit, one decided recently and the
other pending on appeal, place the issue in sharp relief. In the
first case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Center for
Community Action & Environmental Justice v. BNSF Railway
Co. (CCAEJ)8 held that diesel particulate matter emitted from
defendant’s rail yards did not result in the “disposal”9 of solid
waste, and therefore was not subject to the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).10 While RCRA, “our
nation’s primary law governing the disposal of solid and
hazardous waste,”11 and CERCLA, independently regulate
existing and former facilities, respectively, the two are related.
In imposing liability on “any person who . . . arranged for
7. See Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF Ry. Co., 764 F.3d 1019, 1020–
21 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that “emission of diesel particulate matter does not
constitute ‘disposal’ of solid waste”); Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 600 (holding
that “an entity may qualify as an arranger [only] when it takes intentional steps to
dispose of a hazardous substance”); United States v. Gen. Elec.Co., 670 F.3d 377, 384
(1st Cir. 2012) (stating that “Burlington Northern clarified that § 9607(a)(3) liability
may only attach in cases where a person or entity has the distinctly apparent objective
of disposing of its hazardous substances”); Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal
Corp., 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that the passive migration of
contamination did not amount to disposal).
8. Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF Ry. Co. (CCAEJ), 764 F.3d 1019,
1030 (9th Cir. 2014).
9. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act defines disposal as “the discharge,
deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or
hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous
waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air
or discharged into any waters, including ground waters.” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2012).
10. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k
(2012).
11. History of RCRA, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/rcra/history-resource-conservationand-recovery-act-rcra (last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (stating that RCRA is “our nation’s
primary law governing the disposal of solid and hazardous waste”).
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disposal . . .of hazardous substances . . . at any facility,”12
CERCLA relies on RCRA’s definition of “disposal.”13 While the
RCRA definition of disposal applies to both laws, it must be
construed in the different contexts of each regulatory scheme.
A broad reading of CCAEJ as holding that aerial emissions can
never result in disposal of hazardous substances, without
considering the differences between RCRA and CERCLA, could
open a hole in coverage between the Clean Air Act and
CERCLA. Under this interpretation, if a facility’s hazardous
gas emissions do not violate the Clean Air Act, and yet
contaminate a site, parties affected by the contamination
would have no recourse in federal court against those
responsible, and the federal government may not be able to
replenish site cleanup costs taken from the Superfund.14
In the second case, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.
(Pakootas II),15 Teck Resources Limited (Teck), a mining and
smelting company operating in the state of Washington and
across the border in Canada, is currently advancing this theory
in the Ninth Circuit. In Pakootas II, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Washington recently ruled
against Teck, narrowly interpreting CCAEJ in the CERCLA
context. The district court held that hazardous substances
emitted into the air from defendant’s smelter, which is not
subject to the Clean Air Act because it is located in Canada,
were “disposed” at a CERCLA “facility” not when they were
discharged into the air, but when they were deposited on land
and water on plaintiffs’ site in the Upper Columbia River in
Washington.16 The district court, therefore, concluded that
Teck was responsible for its pollution of the Upper Columbia
River site as arrangers for disposal of hazardous substances
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (2012) (emphasis added to highlight CERCLA terms of
art).
13. Id. § 9601(29) (2012) (“disposal . . . shall have the meaning provided in section
1004 of” RCRA).
14. See generally, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012) (listing covered person from whom costs
can be recovered).
15. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (Pakootas II), No. CV-04-256-LRS, 2014
WL 7408399 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014) (to distinguish the different issues at play,
and to highlight similarities, this paper uses the short form Pakootas II when referring
to the subject of this paper—Teck’s aerial emissions from the Trail Smelter, and the
short form Pakootas I when referring to Teck’s discharge of slag and other hazardous
waste directly into the Columbia River. See infra note 93.).
16. Pakootas II, No. CV-04-256-LRS, slip op. at 2.
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under CERCLA §107(a)(3).17 At Teck’s request, the district
court certified its order for interlocutory appeal.18 Teck timely
appealed the order to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
arguing that there is no disposal, as the Court of Appeals
interpreted that term in CCAEJ, and hence no CERCLA
liability “when waste is initially emitted to the air, and then is
transported by wind into land or water.”19 If the Court of
Appeals overrules the district court’s order in Pakootas II,
plaintiff tribes may have no recourse under federal law for the
contamination of their land and water by defendant’s long
term aerial emissions of hazardous substances, and Teck may
escape liability for contaminating the tribes’ land.
Pakootas II is a case of first impression because in “over 30
years of CERCLA jurisprudence, no court has impliedly or
expressly addressed the issue of whether aerial emissions”20
that contaminate a site give rise to CERCLA arranger liability;
rather, “it appears to have been treated as a given” that
CERCLA liability attaches.21 Moreover, according to the EPA,
there are hundreds of sites similar to Teck’s, where a smelter’s
aerial emissions result in the release of hazardous substances
that contaminate a site;22 smelters and other industrial
facilities may escape federal liability for the contamination
they cause if the Ninth Circuit reads a hole in coverage into
the law.
In order to frame the legal controversy, Part II of this
comment provides background information on the relevant
provisions of CERCLA, RCRA, and the Clean Air Act, and
presents a brief summary of the physical and legal history of
the Teck Cominco smelter and the Upper Columbia River site.
Part III of this comment analyzes the controversy by
examining the statutes themselves, as well as recent

17. Id. (holding that Teck’s “arranger liability” arose from the release “of a
hazardous substance” not from its smelter but from wastes deposited on “the UCR Site
located in the United States.”).
18. Id. at 4.
19. Petition for Permission to Appeal at 14, Joseph Pakootas, et al v. Teck Cominco
Metals, Ltd., No. 1 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2015).
20. Pakootas II, No. CV-04-256-LRS, slip op. at 3.
21. Id.
22. Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae as to Defendant’s Motion
for Reconsideration at 1, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-LRS,
2014 WL 7408399 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014) (No. 2140).
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developments in the case law regarding arranger liability.
While the statutes and the case law establish liability on their
own, Part III also looks to the legislative history and finds
confirmation that Congress intended for entities such as Teck
to face liability under CERCLA for their releases of hazardous
substances.
This comment develops the argument that aerial emissions
of hazardous substances that contaminate sites should be
subject to CERCLA’s remediation and liability provisions, in
accordance with the language of the statutes, the overall
statutory framework, the courts’ interpretation of the statutes,
and congressional intent. Part IV concludes that proper
construction of CERCLA arranger liability fills this potential
hole in the law, allowing injured parties or the government to
remediate sites contaminated by the otherwise legal emission
of air pollutants, and placing the costs where they belong, on
the responsible party.
II. BACKGROUND
To frame the issues, this section first outlines the purpose,
scope, and select provisions of the Clean Air Act, CERCLA,
and, to a lesser degree, RCRA. Next, this background section
provides an overview of the Teck Cominco smelter and the
Upper Columbia River site, and briefly summarizes the long
history of litigation between the parties, leading to the current
controversy.
A.

Statutory Provisions

To appreciate the controversy, it is important to understand
the overall reach of the complicated statutes involved, as well
as the relevant statutory terms and provisions that frame the
specific issue of CERCLA arranger liability in the context of
sites contaminated by aerial emissions. As with many federal
environmental statutes, a plethora of terms of art are defined
in the statutes and through common use; the key terms are
described below. The statutes are discussed below in the order
they were enacted—because CERCLA was enacted last, this
progression gives context to the congressional intent
underlying CERCLA, and informs the present controversy.
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1.

The Clean Air Act

On December 31, 1970, Congress enacted the modern Clean
Air Act23 as a major amendment to the Air Pollution Control
Act of 1955.24 Passage of the Clean Air Act was prompted by
recognition that “the growth in the amount and complexity of
air pollution brought about by urbanization, industrial
development, and the increasing use of motor vehicles, has
resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and
welfare.”25 The express purpose of the Clean Air Act was
therefore to “protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s
air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare
and the productive capacity of its population.”26 Because “the
Clean Air Act was enacted and amended for the purpose of
protecting public health,”27 its focus was naturally on limiting
emissions to improve or maintain ambient air quality.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
administers the Clean Air Act.28 EPA describes the “key
elements”29 of the Clean Air Act as:
[R]educing outdoor, or ambient, concentrations of air
pollutants that cause smog, haze, acid rain, and other
problems;
[R]educing emissions of toxic air pollutants that are
known to, or are suspected of, causing cancer or other
serious health effects; and
[P]hasing out production and use of chemicals that
destroy stratospheric ozone.30
Thus, two of the major prongs of the Clean Air Act are
aimed at protecting overall ambient air quality, which is
measured with reference to “criteria air pollutants,”31 and

23. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012).
24. Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2) (2012).
26. Id. § 7401(b)(1).
27. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. U.S. E.P.A., 415 F. Supp. 799, 805 (W.D. Mo. 1976),
aff’d sub nom., Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1977).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 7402 (2012).
29. EPA OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, THE PLAIN ENGLISH
GUIDE TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT, Publication No. EPA-456/K-07-001, 1, 4 (2007),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/peg.pdf.
30. Id.
31. Criteria air pollutants are those pollutants “emissions of which, in [the EPA
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reducing emissions of “hazardous air pollutants.”32 The Clean
Air Act protects ambient air quality by directing the EPA to
enumerate criteria air pollutants33 and develop national
ambient air quality standards34 (NAAQS) that “define the
levels of air quality that must be achieved to protect public
health and welfare.”35 Furthermore, the EPA must promulgate
NAAQS at concentrations protective enough to ensure “an
adequate margin of safety.”36 Related provisions require states
to develop “implementation plans,”37 to achieve “attainment,”38
or “prevent significant deterioration,”39 of ambient air quality.
The Clean Air Act, as amended, also lists 190 hazardous air
pollutants and directs the EPA to promulgate National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPS)
for these chemicals.40 NESHAPS limit the concentration of
pollutants emitted at the source to reduce hazardous “air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to result in an
increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or
incapacitating reversible, illness.”41 To enforce the standard,
the EPA must first “promulgate technology-based emission
standards for categories of sources that emit”42 hazardous air
pollutants. Every eight years thereafter, EPA must “review,
and revise as necessary . . . emission standards promulgated
under this section.”43
Administrator’s] judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (2012).
Criteria air pollutants are the subject of id. §§ 7408–7409.
32. Hazardous air pollutants are those pollutants that “present, or may present,
through inhalation or other routes of exposure, a threat of adverse human health
effects . . . or adverse environmental effects” other than criteria air pollutants. Id. §
7412(b)(2). Hazardous air pollutants are enumerated and described in id. § 7412.
33. “There are currently six criteria air pollutants: carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen
oxides, ozone, particulate matter, and sulfur oxides.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.
EPA, 749 F.3d 1079, 1083 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7408.
35. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 469 (2004); accord 42
U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
37. Id. § 7424.
38. Id. §§ 7501–7515.
39. Id. §§ 7470–7492.
40. Id. § 7412.
41. Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
42. Id. at 980.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(6) (2012).
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Both the NESHAPS and the NAAQS provisions require the
EPA and the states, respectively, to regulate and control the
emission of air pollutants based on health and welfare effects
associated with the resultant concentration of pollutants in the
ambient air. The risk calculations used to set the allowable
emission limits are based on concentrations of pollutants in the
localized44 and regional ambient air,45 respectively.
2.

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

On October 21, 1976, Congress enacted the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 as a major amendment
to the Solid Waste Disposal Act.46 Congress enacted RCRA to
close a “loophole in environmental law, that of unregulated
land disposal of discarded materials and hazardous wastes.”47
As relevant here, “RCRA’s primary purpose is to reduce the
generation of hazardous waste and to ensure the proper
treatment, storage, and disposal of that waste which is
nonetheless generated, so as to minimize the present and
future threat to human health and the environment.”48 RCRA,
which “is a sweeping statute intended to regulate solid waste
from cradle to grave,”49 “empowers EPA to regulate hazardous
wastes . . . with the rigorous safeguards and waste
management procedures of Subtitle C,”50 and to regulate
nonhazardous solid waste “much more loosely under Subtitle
D.”51 RCRA is administered by the EPA, which notes that
RCRA primarily covers “active and future facilities and does
not address abandoned or historical sites.”52

44. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(1)(c) (instructing EPA to evaluate “the actual health
effects with respect to persons living in the vicinity of sources”).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (instructing EPA to set “ambient air quality standards
the attainment and maintenance of which . . . are requisite to protect the public
health” (emphasis added)).
46. Pub. L. No. 89–272, 79 Stat. 997 (1965).
47. H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, 2d Sess. at 4 (1976).
48. Titan Wheel Corp. of Iowa v. EPA, 291 F. Supp. 2d 899, 903-04 (S.D. Iowa 2003),
aff’d sub nom., Titan Wheel Corp. of Iowa v. EPA, 113 F. App’x 734 (8th Cir. 2004).
49. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 408 (1994).
50. City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994).
51. Id.
52. History of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/rcra/history-resource-conservation-and-recovery-act-rcra
(last
visited Feb. 15, 2016).
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In addition to its overall purpose and reach, the following
RCRA definitions are relevant to the issue at hand. RCRA
defines “disposal” as:
[T]he discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling,
leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous
waste into or on any land or water so that such solid
waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof
may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or
discharged into any waters, including ground waters.53
RCRA defines a “hazardous waste” as a:
[S]olid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which
because of its quantity, concentration, or physical,
chemical, or infectious characteristics may—
(A) [C]ause, or significantly contribute to an increase in
mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or
incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) [P]ose a substantial present or potential hazard to
human health or the environment when improperly
treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise
managed.54
As noted above, a material can only be a RCRA hazardous
waste if it is first a “solid waste,” which RCRA defines as “any
garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water
supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and
other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or
contained gaseous material resulting from industrial,
commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from
community activities.”55 Thus defined, RCRA contains
provisions for active solid and hazardous waste generation,
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities to ensure proper
management of such waste.
3.

The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act

Both RCRA and the Clean Air Act were already in place
when, in the late 1970s, “public attention [focused] on a series
of past improper hazardous waste disposal incidents such as

53. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2012).
54. Id. § 6903(5).
55. Id. § 6903(27) (emphasis added).
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the tragedy of Love Canal, New York,”56 which has been
described as “one of the most appalling environmental
tragedies in American history.”57 Love Canal was “a municipal
and industrial chemical dumpsite”58 located in a residential
community that was “originally meant to be a [suburban]
dream community.”59 Before nearby residents understood that
contamination was present, children “returned from play with
burns on their hands and faces,”60 and there was an
abnormally high rate of birth defects, miscarriages, and “high
white-blood-cell counts, a possible precursor of leukemia.”61 At
the time the nature and extent of the problem became
apparent, the federal government did not have statutory
authority or a funding mechanism to address Love Canal, and
the parties that contaminated it were not liable under any
then-existing federal laws.62
In response to this and other previously-contaminated sites,
Congress ultimately enacted CERCLA to fill a hole in coverage
“in then existing law by creating the authority and liability for
cleanup of abandoned facilities contaminated with hazardous
substances.”63 On December 11, 1980, Congress enacted
CERCLA, as modified in 1986 by the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act (“SARA”),64 for two primary purposes:
“to promote the timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to
ensure that the costs of such cleanup efforts were borne by
those responsible for the contamination.”65 The Congressional
intent behind CERCLA must be inferred both because the
56. Arnold & Porter LLP, Arnold & Porter LLP Legislative History: P.L. 96-510, Dec.
11, 1980 [hereinafter A&PLH], 1980 WL 356126.
57. Eckardt
C.
Beck,
The
Love
Canal
Tragedy,
EPA
JOURNAL,
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/love-canal-tragedy (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (EPA Region 2 Administrator, in the year before CERCLA was enacted,
noting that Love Canal was ultimately cleaned up by the taxpayer using “the first
emergency funds ever to be approved for something other than a ‘natural’ disaster,”
lamenting “the missing link of liability,” and asking, generally, “Who’s going to pick up
the tab” for cleaning up legacy contaminated sites?).
63. J. B. Ruhl, The Plight of the Passive Past Owner: Defining the Limits of
Superfund Liability, 45 SW. L.J. 1129, 1129 (1991).
64. Pub. L. No. 99–499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
65. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. 599, 602 (2009).
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statute does not contain an explicit statement of purpose and
because of the lack of a legislative history such as committee
reports or congressional debate. The lack of legislative history
results from the fact that CERCLA was hastily drafted in the
“waning days of the lame-duck session of the 96th Congress,”66
before both the presidency and control of the Senate passed
from the Democrats to the Republicans. As a result, “some of
CERCLA’s provisions are vague and its legislative history
sparse.”67 This has led the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to
note that “neither a logician nor a grammarian will find
comfort in . . . [CERCLA’s] baffling language”68 and the
Supreme Court to wryly suggest that CERCLA is “not a model
of legislative draftsmanship.”69 CERCLA has been heavily
litigated. Nevertheless, it is well established and oft repeated
by the courts that Congress enacted CERCLA for two primary
purposes: “prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and
imposition of all cleanup costs on the responsible party.”70
a.

Authority to Act under CERCLA

Upon a finding that “that there may be an imminent and
substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or
the environment because of an actual or threatened release of a
hazardous substance from a facility,”71 CERCLA authorizes the
President to take “action . . . necessary to protect public health
and welfare and the environment.”72 The statutory terms
release, hazardous substance, and facility, all of which courts
have interpreted broadly, are critical to the authority to act
and the imposition of liability under CERCLA.
CERCLA defines a “release” as “any spilling, leaking,
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting,
escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the
environment . . . but excludes . . . emissions from the engine

66. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt (Exxon Corp.), 475 U.S. 355, 380 n.5 (1986).
67. CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 571 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
68. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 883 (9th Cir. 2001).
69. Exxon Corp., 475 U.S. at 363.
70. Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990)).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2012) (emphasis added, highlighting some key CERCLA
terms of art).
72. Id.
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exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, vessel, or
pipeline pumping station engine.”73 As developed below, this
exclusion may be significant for stationary sources of aerial
emissions such as Teck’s smelter.
CERCLA defined a “hazardous substance” broadly, by
reference to substances designated under then-existing
environmental laws including the Clean Water Act,74 RCRA,
the Clean Air Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA),75 plus additional provisions that authorize EPA to
designate “any element, compound, mixture, solution, or
substance”76 as hazardous. While the definition of hazardous
substances is wide-ranging, CERCLA specifically excludes
“petroleum, including crude oil . . . natural gas, natural gas
liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel
(or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).”77
CERCLA also defines a “facility” quite broadly, to include
“any site or area where a hazardous substance has been
deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to
be located; but does not include any consumer product in
consumer use or any vessel.”78
The President is authorized to perform “abatement
actions”79 to control a release of a hazardous substance at a
facility in accordance with the National Contingency Plan,
which sets forth “procedures and standards for responding to
releases
of
hazardous
substances,
pollutants,
and
contaminants.”80 Abatement actions are defined quite broadly
as securing “such relief as may be necessary to abate such
danger or threat . . . [and] issuing such orders as may be
necessary to protect public health and welfare and the
environment.”81 The EPA may recover all costs of the “removal
or remedial action”82 and “natural resources”83 damages, from

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (2012).
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2697 (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
Id. (“the petroleum exclusion”).
Id. § 9601(9) (emphasis added).
Id. § 9606.
Id. § 9605(a).
Id. § 9606(a).
Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
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potentially responsible persons (PRPs), the customary term of
art for those potentially liable under CERCLA.
b.

Arranger Liability Under CERCLA

Courts have held that CERCLA “is a strict liability
statute”84 that “defines PRPs so broadly as to sweep in
virtually all persons likely to incur cleanup costs.”85 CERCLA
imposes liability for response actions and natural resource
damages on four sets of “persons:”86 current and former facility
owners, operators, and hazardous substance transporters, and
“arrangers.”87 Because the class of owners, operators, and
transporters is typically relatively straightforward, the
interpretation of who may be an arranger has broad
ramifications that define the ambit of CERCLA liability.
CERCLA defines an arranger as “any person who by
contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or
possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any
facility.”88 CERCLA does not define “otherwise arranged for,”
but the plain meaning of the phrase, without textual
limitation, suggests broad application. In some cases, whether
a party arranged for disposal is unambiguous, as when a
generator of hazardous substances pays a treatment facility to
receive and manage the hazardous waste; however, in many
cases it is not so clear whether a party is an “arranger” under
CERCLA. Arranger liability is a high stakes game because
those liable under Section 107 of CERCLA face potential “joint
and several liability”89 for investigations and response actions
that frequently amount to millions of dollars in expenses.

83. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
84. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 136 (2007).
85. Id.
86. CERCLA defines “persons” broadly, as “an individual, firm, corporation,
association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States
Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any
interstate body.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
88. Id. § 9607(a)(3) (emphasis added).
89. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. at 140.
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B.

A Smelter, a River, Two Tribes, and a Controversy

The current controversy surrounding arranger liability for
sites contaminated by aerial emissions of hazardous
substances is well framed in a case currently pending before
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which could have wideranging repurcussions. The case involves a Canadian smelter
near the border with the State of Washington, the Columbia
River, and two tribes located in Washington.
1.

Physical and Sociological Setting

Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., a Canadian corporation, owns
and operates a smelter in Trail, British Columbia (the “Trail
Smelter”), which is located “approximately 10 miles upstream
from the U.S.-Canada border.”90 The Trail Smelter operations
began over a hundred years ago, and between “1906 and 1995,
Teck generated and disposed of hazardous materials, in both
liquid and solid form, into the Columbia River.”91 These
wastes, “including granulated slag, liquid effluent, and other
discharges,”92 contained “arsenic, cadmium, copper, mercury,
lead, and zinc,”93 and other hazardous materials. Teck
historically made no efforts to downplay the prominence of its
smelter’s smokestacks in the town of Trail, as evidenced by the
name and logo of the company-sponsored, two-time World Ice
Hockey Championship “Trail Smoke Eaters” hockey club.94
The hazardous substances Teck released directly into the
Columbia River from the Trail Smelter crossed the U.S. border
and impacted “approximately 150 river miles of the Columbia
River, extending from the U.S.-Canadian border to the Grand

90. EPA, WORK PLAN FOR THE REMEDIAL INVESTIGATION AND FEASIBILITY STUDY,
VOLUME I OF II 4-2 (2008), http://yosemite.epa.gov/r10/cleanup.nsf/sites/upperc.
91. Id. at 1-1.
92. Id.
93. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (Pakootas I), 452 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th
Cir. 2006).
94. The former Trail Smoke Eater’s logo prominently featured the twin smokestacks
of the Trail Smelter, rising above the surrounding (company) town of Trail. For
information surrounding the discovery of valuable minerals near Trail, the
development of the smelter and town, and information about the “Smokies” hockey
team, see the Trail Historical Society’s websites: http://www.trailhistory.com/ and
http://www.historicsmokeeaters.ca/ (last visited April 25, 2015).
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Coulee Dam”95 (the “UCR Site”). The Grand Coulee Dam
created “Lake Roosevelt, a large reservoir extending [up to 133
miles north of the dam] and bordered by over 600 miles of
shoreline, approximately 312 miles of which are part of the
Lake Roosevelt National Recreation Area.”96 The remainder of
the Lake Roosevelt shoreline is “managed by the Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Reservation . . . and the Spokane Tribe of
Indians”97 (collectively, the “Tribes,” and, along with the State
of Washington, “Plaintiffs”). The general public uses Lake
Roosevelt for recreational activities including “boating, fishing,
swimming, wading, camping, canoeing, and hunting,”98 and the
River also “provides a subsistence fishery for Native American
populations.”99 Named plaintiff Joe Pakootas is the elected
Chairman of the Colville Tribe.100
In 1999, the Tribes petitioned EPA to evaluate the UCR
Site.101 EPA and its environmental consultants conducted
several rounds of site investigations, including extensive
records review, sediment sampling, and fish tissue sampling.102
In 2003, EPA’s consultant completed a CERCLA Site
Inspection report summarizing the investigations, and EPA
determined that “the Upper Columbia River site was eligible
for inclusion on CERCLA’s National Priorities List” (NPL).103
The NPL, commonly referred to as the “Superfund List,”
designates those sites that EPA determines are “top priorities
for cleanup and are eligible for CERCLA-financed remedial

95. EPA, supra note 90, at 1-2.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id at 1-3.
99. Id.
100. Joe Pakootas is currently also a candidate for the U.S. House of
Representatives, who touts his “efforts to clean up the Columbia River which has
suffered from heavy metal pollutants from a Canadian mining operation. The case is a
landmark effort to protect international boundary and downstream waters and
habitat.” PAKOOTAS FOR CONGRESS, http://www.pakootasforcongress.com (last visited
April 25, 2015).
101. Upper Columbia River Site Study, EPA,
https://yosemite.epa.gov/r10/cleanup.nsf/sites/upperc (last visited June 7, 2016).
102. See generally EPA, REGION 10: THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST, Technical Documents,
http://yosemite.epa.gov/R10/Cleanup.NSF/ UCR/Technical+Documents (last visited
June 7, 2016) (containing links to several technical investigation reports and related
documents).
103. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 646 F.3d at 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
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action.”104 Courts would later confirm that, “waste from the
Trail Smelter [that came to rest] in the UCR Site adversely
affects the surface water, ground water, sediments, and
biological resources of the Upper Columbia River and Lake
Roosevelt.”105
2.

Pakootas I

On July 12, 2004, the Tribes filed a “Complaint for
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and for Civil Penalties” in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington’s Spokane Court, which the State of Washington
later joined.106 The Plaintiffs alleged that: (1) Teck “Released
Slag Containing Hazardous Substances into the Columbia
River;”107 (2) the slag was “toxic to humans and to aquatic
life;”108 (3) Plaintiffs suffered damages; (4) the EPA had issued
a Unilateral Administrative Order (UAO) under CERCLA
compelling Teck to conduct a detailed “Remedial
Investigation/Feasibility
Study”109
to
investigate
the
environmental impacts and potential remedial measures; (5)
Teck had not complied with the UAO; and (6) EPA “failed to
enforce the UAO.”110 Plaintiffs sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, civil penalties, and attorneys’ fees. On
November 8, 2004, the circuit court denied Teck’s motion to
dismiss.111 While the case was on appeal, EPA and Teck
settled.112 On July 3, 2006, in Pakootas v. Teck Cominco
Metals, Ltd. (Pakootas I),113 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Teck’s motion for
dismissal, holding that:

104. Id.
105. Pakootas I, 452 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).
106. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and for Civil Penalties at 1,
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-0256-AAM (E.D. Wash. July 12,
2004), 2004 WL 2646770.
107. Id. at 3.
108. Id. at 4.
109. Id. at 5.
110. Id. at 6.
111. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-AAM, 2004 WL
2578982, at *17 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004) aff’d, 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006).
112. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 646 F.3d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 2011).
113. Pakootas I, 452 F.3d 1066, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006).
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1) The UCR Site is a CERCLA “facility” because the
slag has “‘come to be located’ there”;114
2) The “leaching of hazardous substances from the slag
at the Site is a CERCLA release,”115 and that release
is “domestic”;116
3) Teck, despite being a Canadian corporation, qualified
as “any person”117 within the meaning of CERCLA;
and
4) “Teck is potentially liable . . . [as an arranger] for
disposal of its slag.”118
Thus, Pakootas I settled several fundamental issues of
Teck’s CERCLA liability for the release resulting from the slag
that came to rest in the river at the UCR Site, including: the
UCR Site was a CERCLA facility; Teck was a CERCLA person;
the court had personal subject matter jurisdiction over the
Canadian company; and Teck “could be liable as [an] arranger
under CERCLA even though it had disposed of slag itself,”119
originally from the Trail Smelter in Canada. Pakootas I also
held, in a “case of first impression,” that the CERCLA release
occurred at the UCR Site when hazardous substances leached
from the slag in the river into the site sediments and waters.
120 In other words, the CERCLA release occurred from the
material deposited in the river, not from the original release of
slag from the Trail Smelter into the Columbia River, more
than 10 miles upstream from the UCR Site and outside of U.S.
jurisdiction.121 The Supreme Court denied Teck’s Petition for
writ of certiorari.122 The litigation, though, had just begun.123

114. Id. at 1074.
115. Id. at 1075.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1076.
118. Id. at 1082.
119. Id. at 1066 (internal quotations omitted).
120. Richard Du Bey et al., CERCLA and Transboundary Contamination in the
Columbia River, 21 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 8, 8 (2006).
121. Pakootas I, 452 F.3d 1066, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the “Upper
Columbia River Site is” the CERCLA “facility”).
122. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. v. Pakootas, 552 U.S. 1095 (2008).
123. As of April 25, 2015, there have been 14 additional court decisions or orders,
and the Pakootas docket now contains more than 2000 items. Litigation remains
ongoing. Washington, U.S. District Court (Spokane), Civil Docket for Case #: 2:04–cv–
00256-LRS.
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On December 14, 2012, the district court ultimately held
Teck liable as an arranger under CERCLA for releases at the
UCR Site resulting from Teck’s disposal of slag and other
material into the river.124 Relevant findings included: “Teck
knew its disposal of hazardous waste into the UCR was likely
to cause harm;”125 there “have been releases and threatened
releases of hazardous substances into the environment from
slag . . . [that is] located at the UCR Site;”126 and, “when a
waste (rather than a useful product or potentially useful
product) is discarded, intent to dispose need not be proved.”127
Additionally, the district court concluded that disposal
occurred not when the slag was released from Teck’s Canadian
smelter into the river (which would not give rise to CERCLA
liability due to extra-territoriality), rather, disposal occurred
when”at least some portion of [Teck’s] slag and effluent came
to a point of repose at the UCR Site.”128 In other words, the
court found Teck liable for their waste material after it had
been transported by natural processes to the water bodies at
the UCR Site, where it released contaminants into the water
and sediment.
3. Pakootas II
On March 17, 2014, Plaintiffs amended their Complaint
alleging that the UCR site was impacted not only by slag
transported via the river, but also that:
From approximately 1906 to the present time, Teck
Cominco emitted certain hazardous substances,
including, but not limited to, lead compounds, arsenic
compounds, cadmium compounds and mercury
compounds into the atmosphere through the stacks at
the Cominco Smelter. The hazardous substances,
discharged into the atmosphere by the Cominco Smelter
travelled through the air into the United States
resulting in the deposition of airborne hazardous

124. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV–04–256–LRS, 2012 WL
6546088, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 14, 2012).
125. Id. at *12.
126. Id. at *16 (internal quotations omitted).
127. Id. at *17 (citing Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. 599, 609–10 (2009)).
128. Id. at *18.
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substances into the Upper Columbia River Site.129
Plaintiffs argued that Teck’s “discharges into the
atmosphere . . . travelled through the air and resulted in
disposal into the [UCR] Site of . . . hazardous substances,”130
which then were released into the environment at the UCR
Site. Plaintiffs requested relief under CERCLA for
reimbursement of investigation and clean-up costs, as well as
natural resource damages.131
On April 3, 2014, Teck filed a motion to strike or dismiss the
claims related to the aerial emissions.132 Teck argued that
“aerial emissions do not constitute disposal under
CERCLA,”133 “Teck did not arrange to dispose of its aerial
emissions,” and therefore, Teck was not liable under CERCLA
for the uncontested release of hazardous substances at the
UCR Site traceable to Teck’s aerial emissions at the Trail
Smelter.134 On July 29, 2014, the district court denied Teck’s
motion.135 On Sept 24, 2014, Teck filed a Motion for
Reconsideration in light of the Court of Appeals’ holding in
CCAEJ that diesel particulate matter emitted into the air from
a rail yard did not result in the “disposal” of solid waste under
RCRA.136 Teck argued that its aerial emissions similarly did
not constitute disposal, and therefore, Teck was not liable
under CERCLA.137 On November 19, 2014, the United States
filed an amicus curia, arguing that Teck’s Motion was “based
on an erroneous, overbroad reading of [CCAEJ] . . . and ignores

129. The Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation’s Fourth Amended
Complaint at 4, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV–04–256–LRS, 2014
WL 7408399 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014) (No. 2099).
130. Id. at 8.
131. Id. at 4.
132. Teck Metals Ltd.’s Motion to Strike, or in the Alternative Dismiss the New
Allegations in Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaints Pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(f) and 12(b)(6) at 4, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No.
CV–04–256–LRS, 2014 WL 7408399 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014) (No. 2104).
133. Id. at 2 (internal quotations omitted and emphasis added).
134. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
135. Order Denying Motion to Strike or Dismiss, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals,
Ltd., No. CV–04–256–LRS, 2014 WL 7408399, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014) (No.
2115).
136. Teck Metals Ltd.’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to
Strike or Dismiss (Oral Argument Requested), Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.,
No. CV–04–256–LRS, 2014 WL 7408399, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014) (No. 2118).
137. Id. at *1.
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the unique circumstances of [CCAEJ] – a citizen suit under . . .
[RCRA] that was primarily aimed at controlling air
emissions.”138 On December 31, 2014, the district court denied
Teck’s motion and certified its order for appeal.139 Teck timely
appealed the order to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,140
which recently agreed to hear the case and granted Teck’s
Motion to Appeal.141
4. The Nature and Breadth of the Controversy
According to the amicus brief filed by the United States in
Pakootas II, there are hundreds of sites similar to Teck’s,
where a smelter’s aerial emissions result in the release of
hazardous substances that contaminate a site.142 Presumably,
there may be many more non-smelter industrial facilities that
discharge hazardous substances into the air, and threaten
public health, and may warrant CERCLA response action.143
In certifying for interlocutory appeal its order finding Teck
liable, the district court noted that in “over 30 years of
CERCLA jurisprudence, no court has impliedly or expressly
addressed the issue of whether aerial emissions leading to
disposal of hazardous substances . . . are actionable under
CERCLA.”144 The court opined that, historically, “it appears to
have been treated as a given.”145 Because, as discussed below,
the current Supreme Court may be receptive to arguments for
scaling back the reach of CERCLA, the outcome of this case
could determine whether Congress’ dual purpose in enacting
CERCLA could be frustrated for sites such as these, by
hampering the cleanup of contaminated sites and failing to
hold the polluters accountable.

138. Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 1.
139. Pakootas II, No. CV–04–256–LRS, 2014 WL 7408399, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Wash.
Dec. 31, 2014).
140. Petition for Permission to Appeal at 14, Joseph Pakootas, et al v. Teck Cominco
Metals, Ltd., No. 1 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2015).
141. Order, Joseph Pakootas, et al v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. 5 (9th Cir. Mar.
25, 2015).
142. Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 1.
143. Id.
144. Pakootas II, 2014 WL 7408399, slip op. at 3.
145. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
As relevant here, a prima facie case for recovery of expenses
or natural resources damages under Section 107 of CERCLA146
requires a plaintiff to establish that: (1) the waste disposal site
is a “facility” as defined in CERCLA,147 (2) “a release or
threatened release of any hazardous substance from the
facility has occurred,”148 (3) the release or threatened release
caused the plaintiff to either “incur response costs that are
consistent with the national contingency plan,”149 or suffer
natural resources damages,150 and (4) the “defendant is within
one of four classes of persons subject to” CERCLA’s liability
provisions.151
Often the first element is not disputed, because a “facility” is
broadly defined to include sites controlled by defendants or
their contractors: “any site or area where a hazardous
substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or
otherwise come to be located.”152 It is less clear, however,
whether a contaminated site that the defendant did not own or
operate and at which defendant did not contract for disposal is
a CERCLA facility. Whether such a site is a CERCLA facility
is a fact-specific inquiry, and similar cases have been decided
differently.153 Ultimately, most courts have historically set a
low bar for finding that a site is a facility. The Ninth Circuit

146. Teck Metals Ltd.’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to
Strike or Dismiss (Oral Argument Requested), Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.,
No. CV–04–256–LRS, 2014 WL 7408399, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014) (No. 2118).
147. 3550 Stevens Creek Associates v. Barclays Bank of California (Stevens Creek),
915 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2014 (1991).
148. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)) (internal quotations omitted).
149. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4), 9607(a)(4)(B)) (internal quotations omitted).
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
151. Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1358.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(3).
153. See, e.g., Kane v. United States, 15 F.3d 87, 89 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that a
building with asbestos materials installed inside is not a CERCLA facility because
“Congress intended to provide recovery only for releases or threatened releases from
inactive and abandoned waste sites, not releases from useful consumer products in the
structure of buildings” (internal quotations omitted)); but see, Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d
1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1990) (a similar asbestos-in-a-building case where liability did lie
and the court stated that “the term facility has been broadly construed by the courts,
such that in order to show that an area is a facility, the plaintiff need only show that a
hazardous substance under CERCLA is placed there or has otherwise come to be
located there”) (internal quotations omitted).
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Court of Appeals set a particularly undemanding standard
when it held that “in order to show that an area is a facility,
the plaintiff need only show that a hazardous substance under
CERCLA is placed there or has otherwise come to be located
there.”154 The UCR Site certainly passes this low bar, as would
other similar sites where hazardous aerial emissions settle.
While evaluating the slag and other material that flowed
down the Columbia River and eventually contaminated the
UCR Site, the appeals court in Pakootas I found that “the
passive migration of hazardous substances into the
environment from where hazardous substances have come to be
located is a release under CERCLA.”155 In other words, the
CERCLA facility was the site where the materials that caused
the release came to rest, not necessarily the place from which
the materials were originally discharged (the Trail Smelter).
This logic applies no less to material transported through the
air (the aerial emissions in Pakootas II) than material
transported through the water (the slag and other discharges
in Pakootas I).
The second element, a release or threatened release of any
hazardous substance from the facility, is a factual finding that
a plaintiff must establish. This is typically accomplished by
conducting a Preliminary Assessment and Site Inspection,
and, if warranted, a Remedial Investigation.156 These CERCLA
investigations most often involve reviewing historical records,
investigating sites, including collecting environmental samples
and submitting them to laboratories for analysis, and modeling
of the fate and transport of the hazardous substances.157 The
Pakootas I court specifically found that the CERCLA release
from waterborne materials occurred at the UCR Site, not at
the smelter where the materials were first discharged.158 The
154. Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1360.
155. Pakootas I, 452 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
156. See
Superfund
Cleanup
Process,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-cleanup-process (last visited Apr. 29, 2016).
157. Id.
158. Pakootas I, 452 F.3d at 1075, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1095 (2008) (affirming the
lower court’s Order that described the CERCLA facility as the “[UCR] Site, not the
Trail Smelter in Canada or the Columbia River in Canada” where the hazardous
substances were first released, and concluding that “[w]e hold that the leaching of
hazardous substances from the slag at the [UCR] Site is a CERCLA release. That
release—a release into the United States from a facility in the United States—is
entirely domestic,” and therefore subject to CERCLA.).
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exact same reasoning should apply in Pakootas II to the
putative CERCLA release at the UCR Site resulting from the
deposition of airborne materials. Indeed, the parties do not
dispute that there was a release of hazardous substances at
the UCR Site traceable to Teck’s aerial emissions at the Trail
Smelter.159
The third element, necessary response costs (and possibly
natural resources damages), is also primarily a factual
inquisition. Generally, a plaintiff must show that remediation
costs were “necessary,”160 a standard that “requires that an
actual and real threat to human health or the environment
exist before initiating a response action.”161 This element was
not in dispute in Pakootas I, and is not in dispute in Pakootas
II.162
Therefore, as is often the case for releases from industrial
facilities such as the Teck Smelter, the first three elements of
CERCLA liability are not disputed. Here, the UCR Site is a
CERCLA “facility,” and, at this stage of litigation, the parties
neither dispute whether there was a release nor whether a
response is warranted. Therefore, because Teck does not own
or operate the contaminated UCR Site, the dispositive issue for
CERCLA liability is the fourth element of the prima facie case:
whether the defendant arranged for disposal of hazardous
substances. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling on Teck’s arranger
defense could have enormous consequences.163
A.

In Purposefully Discharging Hazardous Substances from
the Trail Smelter Stacks, Teck Arranged for Disposal
Under CERCLA

Historically, courts widely held that “a liberal judicial
interpretation of the term [arranger] is required in order that

159. See generally Pakootas I, 452 F.3d at 1069 (discussing whether a CERCLA
“disposal” occurred, but silent on whether there was a release and whether the release
was traceable to Teck’s emissions, because these issues were not raised by the parties).
160. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2001).
161. Id.
162. See generally Pakootas I, 452 F.3d 1066, and Pakootas II, No. CV–04–256–LRS,
2014 WL 7408399 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014) (discussing several legal questions, but
not the necessity of response actions nor the existiance of natural resource damages,
because these issues were not raised by the parties).
163. See text accompanying note 142, supra.
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we achieve CERCLA’s ‘overwhelmingly remedial’ statutory
scheme.”164 The oft-cited opinion by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp.
is typical: “Congress used broad language in providing for
liability for persons who ‘by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for’ the disposal of hazardous substances.”165 The
Aceto court declined to interpret arranger liability “in any way
that apparently frustrates the statute’s goals, in the absence of
a specific congressional intent otherwise.”166 The First Circuit
Court of Appeals similarly held that “arranger liability was
intended to deter and, if necessary, to sanction parties seeking
to evade liability by contracting away responsibility.”167
Traditionally, courts overwhelmingly employed a liberal
interpretation of arranger liability even though CERCLA
liability is “strict, joint, and several,”168 which might otherwise
engender restraint in imposing liability.
Against this backdrop of liberal interpretation of “arranger”
in the courts of appeals, the Supreme Court considered the
reach of arranger liability “for the first time”169 in Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States,170 on
appeal from the Ninth Circuit. Burlington Northern involved
Brown & Bryant, Inc. (“B&B”), an agricultural chemical
distributer that purchased pesticides and other chemicals from
Shell Oil Company and others.171 B&B began its operations in
1960 and eventually expanded its operations onto Burlington
Northern’s adjacent property.172 B&B mixed, stored, and
transported pesticides and other chemicals that were released
164. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir.
1990); accord United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F.Supp. 898, 902
(D.N.H. 1985).
165. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir.
1989) (emphasis in original).
166. Id.
167. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 670 F.3d 377, 382 (1st Cir. 2012) (internal
quotations omitted).
168. Petro-Chem Processing, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.2d 433, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
169. Peter J. McGrath Jr., Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., et al. v.
United States: Defining Environmental Law or Changing It?, 3 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 85,
89 (2011).
170. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. 599, 599 (2009).
171. Id.
172. Id.
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over time into the environment and contaminated the
groundwater aquifer beneath the sites with hazardous
substances.173 By 1989, B&B became insolvent, and the site
was added to the NPL.174 The State of California and the EPA
(the “Governments”) exercised their authority under CERCLA
and analogous State law to undertake cleanup efforts at the
site.175 By the time of trial, the Governments had already spent
more than $8 million and Burlington Northern had incurred
more than $3 million performing remediation.176
Burlington Northern brought suit for recovery under Section
107 of CERCLA against B&B, and the Governments brought
suit both against Burlington Northern as an owner and
against Shell as an arranger for disposal.177 The Governments’
suits were consolidated.178 At the conclusion of a four-year
trial, the district court held179 that both Burlington Northern
and Shell were liable “under CERCLA—the Railroads because
they were owners . . .and Shell because it had arranged for the
disposal of hazardous substances through its sale and delivery
of”180 pesticides and chemicals that B&B released during their
routine commercial operations. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals first recognized that Shell was not “a
traditional arranger”181 who contracted for disposal. However,
the court held that Shell was liable “under a broader category
of arranger,”182 because Shell’s disposal of hazardous wastes
was “a foreseeable byproduct of”183 its activities. The court
stated further that “arranger liability was not precluded by the
fact that the purpose of Shell’s action had been to transport a

173. Id.
174. Id. at 605.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. In addition to the arranger liability issue, Burlington Northern is also
frequently cited for its other landmark holding that liberalized the ability of courts,
which previously primarily imposed joint & several liability, to apportion costs under
CERCLA. The apportionment issue is not analyzed in this paper.
180. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. 605 (internal quotations omitted).
181. Id. at 606.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 606–07.
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useful and previously unused product to B & B for sale.”184 The
Court of Appeals stated that broadly construed arranger
liability “accords with the statutory language and structure as
a whole,” and specifically held that the CERCLA definition of
disposal includes unintentional activities and “need not be
purposeful.”185
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and went on to issue
its seminal Burlington Northern decision on May 4, 2009.186
The Court began by agreeing with the Court of Appeals that
analysis of arranger liability “is fact intensive and case
specific,”187 but signaled a reluctance to interpret the statute
broadly when it stated that, “such liability may not extend
beyond the limits of the statute itself.”188 The Court therefore
held that “mere knowledge that spills and leaks continued to
occur”189 was not enough to establish liability. Finding no
statutory definition for the CERCLA term “arrange,” the Court
looked to the ordinary (dictionary) meaning, and concluded
that arrange “implies action directed to a specific purpose.”190
The Court acknowledged that “in some instances an entity’s
knowledge that its product will be leaked, spilled, dumped, or
otherwise discarded may provide evidence of the entity’s intent
to dispose of its hazardous wastes,”191 but went on to hold that
“knowledge alone is insufficient to prove that an entity
‘planned for’ the disposal, particularly when the disposal
occurs as a peripheral result of the legitimate sale of an
unused, useful product.”192 The Court thus absolved Shell of
arranger liability.193

184. Id. at 607 (internal quotations and brackets omitted).
185. United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 949 (9th Cir.
2008), rev’d, 556 U.S. 599 (2009) (internal quotes and brackets omitted) (quoting
Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 880 (9th Cir. 2001)).
186. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. 599 (2009).
187. Id. at 610.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 613.
190. Id. at 611 (finding a requirement of intent to dispose in the definition of
arrange: “to make preparations for: plan; to bring about an agreement or
understanding concerning” (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 64
(10th ed. 1993)).
191. Id. at 612.
192. Id.
193. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. 599, 619 (2009).
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Justice Ginsberg dissented, explaining that Shell’s activities
“necessarily and immediately resulted in the leakage of
hazardous substances.”194 The dissent agreed with the Court of
Appeals that relieving “Shell of any obligation to pay for the
cleanup . . . is surely at odds with CERCLA’s objective—to
place the cost of remediation on persons whose activities
contributed to the contamination rather than on the taxpaying
public.”195
The Burlington Northern Court’s interpretation of the
statutory language threatens to change the landscape for
CERCLA arranger liability if it is understood to universally
require a showing of “intent . . . to dispose of a hazardous
substance”196 in what was widely and uniformly regarded as a
strict liability scheme. Furthermore, the holding appears to
require specific “intent to dispose of . . . hazardous wastes”197
rather than an entity’s mere “knowledge that its product will
be leaked, spilled, dumped, or otherwise discarded.”198 This
change in the landscape “heighten[s] the burden for
establishing arranger liability.”199
Indeed, many PRPs have escaped arranger liability since the
Court’s decision in Burlington Northern.200 However, while the
Supreme Court has narrowed arranger liability in general,
even the most demanding construction of this new test should
not establish a hole in coverage big enough for a PRP such as
Teck to slip through. As a threshold matter, the discharge of
194. Id. at 622 (Justice Ginsberg, dissenting) (brackets omitted).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 611.
197. Id. at 612.
198. Id.
199. Greg DeGulis, Sarah Gable, Burlington Northern: CERCLA and Its EverChanging, Unpredictable Landscape, 28 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 40, 40 (2014).
200. See, e.g., Vine St. LLC v. Borg Warner Corp., 776 F.3d 312, 318 (5th Cir. 2015)
(finding no arranger liability for a supplier of dry cleaning chemicals who knowingly
but unintentionally discharged chemicals in its wastewater); Team Enterprises, LLC
v. W. Inv. Real Estate Trust, 647 F.3d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding a
“manufacturer of a machine used in the dry cleaning process” not an arranger when
their customer, a dry cleaner, “disposed of this wastewater by pouring it down the
sewer drain”); City of Merced Redevelopment Agency v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 1:08CV–714–LJO–GSA, 2015 WL 471672, slip op. at 26 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2015) (finding no
arranger liability when oil companies sold “MTBE-containing gasoline” that
contaminated a city’s groundwater because the buyer stored the gasoline in leaking
underground storage tanks because the PRPs “did not intend to dispose of a hazardous
substance”).
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pollutants from an industrial stack cannot be described as
unintentional, in any sense of the word. Indeed, such stacks
are purposefully designed to extend far above ground precisely
in order to disperse hazardous substances and other industrial
waste products over great distances, thereby decreasing their
concentrations at any given point near the stack. Similarly,
facilities are purposefully operated to ensure that airborne
emissions are delivered into the stacks. The design,
permitting, construction, and continued operation of industrial
stacks can only be described as “intentional steps to dispose of
a hazardous substance.”201 These intentional acts should easily
satisfy the Burlington Northern test for arranger liability.
Furthermore, while a number of PRPs have cited Burlington
Northern to successfully evade arranger liability,202 a
significant number of these successful defendants escaped
under the well-established “useful products doctrine,” which
pre-dates Burlington Northern.203 Under the useful product
doctrine, a PRP is not liable for transactions involving a
commercial product before it becomes waste subject to
CERCLA,204 when it was the subsequent owner of the useful
product who caused the release of hazardous substances.205
201. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. 599, 600 (2009).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Fed. Res. Corp., No. 2:11–CV–00127–BLW–RC, 2014
WL 3400477 (D. Idaho July 14, 2014) (holding that the U.S. was not an arranger for
the disposal of mine waste when it encouraged the plaintiff to establish a mine at a
site, permitted the mine, and “knew the tailings were dumped on-site and could have
but failed to direct proper disposal of the tailings to prevent pollution”); Gregory Vill.
Partners, L.P. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., No. C 11–1597 PJH, 2012 WL 832879, at *9
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2012) (finding that a county sanitary district was not an arranger
when it “installed and maintained a sewer line, and imposed a fee on property owners
for access to the sewer line” that conveyed and discharged hazardous substances.);
Celanese Corp. v. Martin K. Eby Const. Co., 620 F.3d 529, 530 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding
that a construction company was not an arranger when its employee accidentally and
unknowingly struck and damaged a pipeline with a backhoe, when years later the
pipeline broke and released methanol). But see United States v. Dico, Inc., 892 F.
Supp. 2d 1138, 1157 (S.D. Iowa 2012) (holding a company that sold PCB-contaminated
buildings liable as an arranger, dismissing defendant’s useful products doctrine
argument because the products were actually sold “for the purpose of disposing of
hazardous waste”).
203. Compare supra note 200.
204. A & W Smelter & Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998);
accord State of Cal. on Behalf of State Dep’t of Toxic Substances v. Summer Del
Caribe, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 574, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
205. See, e.g., Team Enterprises, LLC v. W. Inv. Real Estate Trust, 647 F.3d 901,
913 (9th Cir. 2011); Hinds Investments, L.P. v. Team Enterprises, Inc., No. CV F 07–
0703 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 1663986, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010).
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One could argue that the Court should have decided
Burlington Northern on the basis of the useful products
doctrine alone and need not have read additional requirements
into CERCLA arranger liability. Indeed, many of the postBurlington Northern defendants who failed to escape arranger
liability were those who were not covered by the useful product
doctrine.206
Industrial polluters such as Teck, who operate their
smokestacks in a manner that contaminates downwind
properties, should not escape the repercussions of their actions
based on Burlington Northern’s apparent departure from
CERCLA’s well-established strict liability scheme. Such a
result would thwart the very purpose for which Congress
included arranger liability within CERCLA. However, if such a
defendant has a colorable case, they may wish to press the
issue to a potentially receptive Supreme Court. As noted
above, while the Court could have simply decided Burlington
Northern on the well-established useful products doctrine, the
Court went further and stated that “under the plain language
of the statute, an entity may qualify as an arranger . . . when it
takes intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance.”207
Despite this apparent limitation, one could reasonably
interpret the phrase “may qualify” as merely identifying
sufficient cause for arranger liability in useful product cases,
i.e., “when the disposal occurs as a peripheral result of the
legitimate sale of an unused, useful product.”208 Therefore,
although many courts appear to have interpreted Burlington
Northern’s intent to arrange for disposal as a necessary
finding,209 Burlington Northern’s intent requirement should be
206. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 670 F.3d 377, 385 (1st Cir. 2012)
(finding arranger liability when defendant “viewed scrap Pyranol as waste material
and that any profit it derived from selling scrap Pyranol to Fletcher was subordinate
and incidental to the immediate benefit of being rid of an overstock of unusable
chemicals”); Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757, 764–65 (6th Cir.
2014) (accepting the lower court’s holding that companies who sent materials to a
landfill “arranged to have contaminants placed on the Site”); Arkema Inc. v. Anderson
Roofing Co., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1324 (D. Or. 2010) (denying defendants motion to
dismiss for “dispos[al] of wastes at a common oil sump disposal facility” when “such
wastes are present in the sediments at the Portland Harbor Site”).
207. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. 599, 611 (2009) (emphasis added).
208. Id. at 612.
209. See, e.g., Team Enterprises, LLC v. W. Inv. Real Estate Trust, 647 F.3d 901,
909 (9th Cir. 2011); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 781 F.3d 129, 155
(4th Cir. 2015); Vine St. LLC v. Borg Warner Corp., 776 F.3d 312, 317 (5th Cir. 2015);
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limited to its facts, and applied only to cases involving
arranger liability for the seller of useful products. Accordingly,
because Teck intentionally released hazardous substances
through stacks constructed and operated for the express
purpose of transporting its airborne industrial waste far away
from the smelter, Teck’s argument that it did not “arrange” for
disposal of hazardous substances via aerial emissions should
fail.
B.

Teck’s Deposition of Airborne Hazardous Substances upon
the Land and Water at the UCR Site Constitutes Disposal
Under CERCLA

Teck should not evade liability under CERCLA for
contaminating the UCR Site merely because it first discharged
the pollutants into the air. In the district court, Teck argued
that the CERCLA definition of disposal, “the discharge,
deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any
solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or
water,”210 omitted aerial emissions from the ambit of CERCLA
disposal. Teck further contended that the CCAEJ holding
confirms that “emissions of solid waste directly into the air”211
cannot comprise disposal. Relatedly, Teck also argued that
Congress did not intend CERCLA to address contamination
resulting from aerial emissions both because “the [Clean Air
Act] addressed air emissions”212 and because CERCLA relied
on RCRA’s definition of disposal, and RCRA had not “sought to
address”213 air pollution. As demonstrated below, however,

NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682, 706 (7th Cir. 2014), reh’g
denied (Nov. 5, 2014).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2012).
211. Teck Metals Ltd.’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to
Strike or Dismiss at 3, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (No. 2118), 2004 WL
2578982 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004).
212. Teck Metals Ltd.’s Motion to Strike, or in the Alternative Dismiss the New
Allegations in Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaints Pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(f) and 12(b)(6) at 8–9, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (No.
2104), 2004 WL 2578982 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004) (citing S. Rep. No. 94-988, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), in turn referencing an EPA report that indicated “legislative
controls over land disposal of hazardous wastes are inadequate” but “air and water
pollution control authorities are adequate,” U.S. EPA, Report to Congress: Disposal of
Hazardous Wastes, Pub. No. SW-115 (1974)).
213. Teck Metals Ltd.’s Motion to Strike, or in the Alternative Dismiss the New
Allegations in Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaints Pursuant to Federal Rules of
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these arguments miss the mark and should not absolve Teck of
responsibility for contaminating the UCR Site.
1.

Teck’s Reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s Rejection of a RCRA
Suit to Enforce Ambient Air Quality Standards is
Misplaced; the Deposition of Airborne Contaminants on
the UCR Site Constitutes Disposal

In CCAEJ, the Ninth Circuit was called on to decide
“whether the citizen-suit provision of . . . RCRA . . . may be
used to enjoin the emission from Defendants’ railyards of
particulate matter found in diesel exhaust.”214 CCAEJ
plaintiffs argued that “particles are inhaled by people both
directly and after the particles have fallen to the earth and
then have been re-entrained into the air by wind,”215 causing
“elevated cancer risk”216 to the surrounding community.
CCAEJ plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief
under RCRA, arguing that “diesel particulates constitute solid
waste and hazardous waste, the handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal of which Defendants have
contributed or are contributing to.”217 CCAEJ defendants
countered that air emissions and ambient air quality are
subject to the Clean Air Act,218 not RCRA, because “even if
Congress had intended RCRA to apply in this context . . .
Defendants did not emit diesel exhaust into or on any land or
water, and therefore were not disposing of solid waste within
the meaning of RCRA.”219
The CCAEJ court analyzed the legislative history of RCRA
and the Clean Air Act, and concluded that “RCRA, in light of
its purpose to reduce the volume of waste that ends up in our
nation’s landfills, governs land disposal. The Clean Air Act, by

Civil Procedure 12(f) and 12(b)(6) at 8, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (No.
2104), 2004 WL 2578982 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004).
214. Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF Ry. Co. (Ctr. for Cmty. Action),
764 F.3d 1019, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014).
215. Id. at 1021.
216. Id. (brackets omitted).
217. Id. at 1021–22.
218. The Clean Air Act’s citizen suit provisions only apply to air permitting decisions
and violations of air permits, which would not have helped the Ctr. for Cmty. Action
plaintiffs. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
219. Ctr. for Cmty. Action, 764 F.3d at 1022.
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contrast, governs air pollutants.”220 Furthermore, the court
concluded that “railyards, as indirect sources of air pollution,
are excluded from regulation under both statutory schemes.”221
The court therefore found that Congress intentionally left this
hole in coverage,222 and concluded that “emissions such as
those at issue here—emissions from indirect sources like
railyards—fall entirely outside the ambit of federal
regulation.”223 Teck argues that the holding of the CCAEJ
court that aerially “emitting diesel particulate matter from
[Defendants] railyards and intermodal facilities . . . [does not
amount to disposal] of solid waste in violation of RCRA,”224
immunizes Teck from CERCLA liability due to the purported
lack of disposal associated with Teck’s air emissions.
However, CCAEJ must be understood in the contexts of its
facts and the aims of its parties. CCAEJ plaintiffs, left with no
recourse under the Clean Air Act,225 sought to use RCRA’s
citizen suit provision to remedy emissions “discharged into the
air . . .[containing] particles [that] are inhaled by people.”226
Therefore, CCAEJ plaintiffs used the fact that some of the
particles were deposited on the ground prior to being “reentrained into the atmosphere”227 in order to ground their
citizen suit in RCRA. However, CCAEJ plaintiffs’ goal was to
enjoin the defendant’s pollution of the ambient air; they did not
allege a disposal or release at any site.228 The CCAEJ court
concluded that RCRA “disposal does not extend to emissions of

220. Id. at 1029 (internal quotations omitted).
221. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
222. Id. at 1029 (Noting that that “statutory and legislative histories . . . make clear
that RCRA . . . governs ‘land disposal.’ The Clean Air Act, by contrast, governs air
pollutants,” and that “the histories further clarify that Defendants’ railyards, as
‘indirect sources’ of air pollution, are excluded from regulation under both statutory
schemes”). Note that neither the Ctr. for Cmty. Action parties nor the court mentioned
CERCLA.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1030.
225. The Clean Air Act authorizes citizen suits only for: violation of air emission
standards, EPA orders enforcing emissions standards, failure of the EPA to perform
non-discretionary duties, and permit violations. 42 USCS § 7604(a) (2012). None of
these situations applied to CCAEJ.
226. Ctr. for Cmty. Action, 764 F.3d at 1019.
227. Id.
228. The Ctr. for Cmty. Action parties did not mention and the court did not consider
CERCLA.
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solid waste directly into the air.”229 While it could be argued
that the CCAEJ court improperly applied the definition of
disposal,230 its overall conclusion was sound: “the regulation of
emissions from locomotives and railyards was governed solely
by the Clean Air Act,”231 and the Clean Air Act specifically
exempted “regulation of [indirect] sources like Defendants’
railyards.”232 The CCAEJ court thus found a congressionally
considered and intended hole in coverage for these indirect
sources and declined to stretch RCRA to address ambient air
quality impacts.
This hole in coverage for aerial emissions from railyards
under the Clean Air Act and RCRA, however, should not be
widened by allowing a facility like Teck’s industrial smelter to
avoid CERCLA liability for contaminating the UCR Site.
Unlike the situation in CCAEJ, which was an attempt to
enjoin activities that affected ambient air quality, the situation
in Pakootas II involves a contaminated site, including land and
water. This is precisely the hole in coverage in then-existing
federal law that CERCLA was enacted to fill, and the release
of hazardous substances at the UCR Site lies squarely within
the ambit of CERCLA. The RCRA definition of disposal
includes depositing “any solid waste or hazardous waste into or
on any land or water.”233 The deposition of airborne hazardous
substances on the UCR Site falls within the plain meaning of
deposit: to “let fall or drop by a natural process: foster the
accretion or accumulation of . . . to become precipitated: settle .
229. Ctr. for Cmty. Action, 764 F.3d at 1024.
230. The Ctr. for Cmty. Action court held that:
The text of § 6903(3) is also very specific: it limits the definition of disposal to
particular conduct causing a particular result. By its terms, disposal includes only
conduct that results in the placement of solid waste into or on any land or water. That
placement, in turn, must be so that such solid waste may enter the environment or be
emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters. We
therefore conclude that disposal occurs where the solid waste is first placed into or on
any land or water and is thereafter emitted into the air.
Ctr. for Cmty. Action, 764 F.3d at 1024 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotations, citations, and
ellipses removed; emphasis in original). The court cited no authority for its conclusion
that waste must first be placed into or on any land for RCRA to apply. This judicial
reconstruction of the statute, though arguably improper, was not required for the court
to hold that the Clean Air Act and not RCRA, governs ambient air quality, and may
therefore be considered dicta (if not erroneous).
231. Ctr. for Cmty. Action, 764 F.3d 1019, 1027 (9th Cir. 2014).
232. Id.
233. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2012).
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. . something laid, placed, or thrown down; esp matter
deposited by some natural process . . . a natural
accumulation.”234 The deposition (or precipitation) of airborne
solid particles upon the land is a natural process, scientifically
driven by differences in density and temperature, that results
in the accumulation (or deposition) of the solid material. Teck
constructed and operated its stacks precisely in order to
dispose of its hazardous industrial waste at a site far distant
from Teck’s smelter. The hazardous substances were no less
disposed at the UCR Site because they were first discharged
into the air and then deposited upon the land then had Teck
directly dumped its hazardous substances at the UCR Site.
2.

Congress Crafted CERCLA to Cover Contamination at
Sites Such as UCR

The limitations imposed on polluters under the Clean Air
Act were crafted to “protect and enhance the quality of the
Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and
welfare and the productive capacity of its population.”235 The
Clean Air Act does not address contaminated sites in any way.
Similarly, RCRA was crafted to assure “that hazardous waste
management practices are conducted in a manner which
protects human health and the environment,”236 not to address
previously-contaminated sites. Thus, in the first part of the
CCAEJ decision the court found that RCRA “governs land
disposal . . . [while the] Clean Air Act, by contrast, governs air
pollutants.”237 The court found that “emitting diesel particulate
matter into the air does not constitute disposal as that term is
defined under RCRA.”238 Rather than stopping there, in the
second part of the CCAEJ decision, the court nevertheless
considered plaintiffs’ argument that RCRA and the Clean Air
Act should be “harmonized”239 to fill the hole in coverage that
left the railyards emissions unregulated. However, the court

234. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
605 (3d ed. 2002).
235. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b).
236. Id. § 6902(4).
237. Ctr. for Cmty. Action, 764 F.3d 1019, 1029 (9th Cir. 2014).
238. Id. at 1025.
239. Id. at 1022.
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noted that during the “1977 overhaul”240 of the Clean Air Act,
which was enacted a year after the passage of RCRA and three
years before CERCLA, EPA and Congress expressly considered
air emissions from both the general class of indirect sources
and the specific subclass of railyards, and declined to regulate
them under the Clean Air Act. The CCAEJ court declined to
fill this hole in coverage, reasoning “any ‘gap’ was the product
of a careful and reasoned decision made by Congress that we
are not at liberty to disturb.”241 Congress crafted CERCLA,
however, to fill just such a hole in coverage, when it results in
contamination of a site that threatens human health and the
environment.242
CERCLA was enacted precisely to enable remediation of
sites contaminated by industrial hazardous waste, such as the
UCR Site. Thus, as the district court held in Pakootas II, the
CERCLA disposal occurred not at the point of “aerial emissions
from Teck’s smelter.”243 Rather, the CERCLA disposal occurred
when the hazardous substances in the air were “deposit[ed] . . .
into or on any land or water . . . [where it could] enter the
environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any
waters, including ground waters.”244 This is in accord with the
RCRA definition of disposal, which includes depositing. The
ensuing CERCLA release245 occurred when the hazardous
substances emitted, discharged, leached, or otherwise escaped
into the environment from the materials deposited on the UCR
Site.
3.

The Statutory Language Confirms that Congress Intended
CERCLA to Address Sites Contaminated by Aerial
Emissions from Stationary Industrial Sources

It is particularly noteworthy that CERCLA, like the Clean
Air Act as discussed above, expressly excludes liability for

240. Id. at 1027.
241. Id. at 1030.
242. See Part III.C., infra (detailing how the congressional history confirms that
Congress intended CERCLA to address contaminated sites by filling in the holes in
coverage left by RCRA, the Clean Water Act, and the Clean Air Act).
243. Pakootas II, No. CV–04–256–LRS, 2014 WL 7408399, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Wash.
Dec. 31, 2014).
244. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2012).
245. See the CERCLA definition of “release” at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
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releases due to “emissions from the engine exhaust of . .
.rolling stock.”246 This CERCLA exclusion for liability
stemming from emissions from rolling stock (railroad cars), as
well as certain other categories of aerial emissions, i.e. “a
motor vehicle, . . . aircraft, vessel, or pipeline pumping station
engine,”247 conclusively shows that Congress did consider
aerial emissions as potential sources of hazardous substances.
Moreover, the fact that Congress expressly exempted a few
categories of aerial emissions from CERCLA clearly evidences
Congress’ conscious decision that other categories of aerial
emissions do fall squarely within the ambit of CERCLA. To
hold otherwise would offend logic and fundamental canons of
statutory construction.
First, the familiar canon expressio unius est exclusio
alterius248 applies here—because Congress expressly excluded
some classes of aerial emissions from CERCLA liability, it
logically and necessarily follows that Congress considered the
issue of aerial emissions in the CERCLA context and that
Congress intended other classes of aerial emissions to give rise
to CERCLA liability. Furthermore, because each enumerated
exemption relates to vehicles or petroleum (the latter of which
enjoys a blanket exclusion from CERCLA), it can be reasonably
inferred that industrial point sources of hazardous air
emissions, such as the Trail Smelter, are precisely the kind of
emissions not excluded from CERCLA liability. Second, if, as
Teck argues, all sources of aerial emissions are categorically
immune from CERCLA liability despite their contamination of
sites, then the exemption in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22)(B) for certain
classes of aerial emissions becomes mere surplusage, a result
that the Supreme Court has recognized should be avoided in
order to give effect to congressional intent.249 Finally, as the
246. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22)(B).
247. Id.
248. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (Defining expressio unius est exclusio
alterius as a “canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies
the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative”). The Supreme Court recognized this
canon when it “accept[ed] the proposition that when a statute limits a thing to be done
in a particular mode, it includes a negative of any other mode.” Christensen v. Harris
Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 582–83 (2000) (internal brackets and quotations omitted) (quoting
Raleigh & G.R. Co. v. Reid, 80 U.S. 269, 270 (U.S. 1871)). For more recent Supreme
Court affirmations of this well-established canon, see Arizona v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 2492 (2012), and POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014).
249. Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 304 (2009) (stating that “a statute should
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Supreme Court recently held, provisions should be constructed
with reference to their “wider statutory context;”250 it is a
“fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of
a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their
place in the overall statutory scheme.”251 Here, CERCLA’s
liability provisions should be read with reference to the whole
act,252 which is structured to ensure “prompt cleanup of
hazardous waste sites and imposition of all cleanup costs on
the responsible party.”253 Exclusions in CERCLA coverage
should not be read into that act,254 absent clear indications of
congressional intent, which are not present here.
C.

The Congressional History Confirms that Congress
Intended CERCLA to Address Contaminated Sites by
Filling in the Holes in Coverage left by RCRA, the Clean
Water Act, and the Clean Air Act

While the language and structure of the statute are
sufficient to establish that CERCLA was intended to cover
releases of hazardous substances due to aerial emissions of
industrial waste, the sparse legislative history also confirms
this intent. On June 13, 1979, President Carter transmitted to
Speaker O’Neill draft legislation intended to fill holes in
coverage in existing environmental law to “address some of the
most significant environmental and public health problems
facing our Nation.”255 This proto-CERCLA legislation was

be construed to give effect to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
superfluous, void or insignificant” (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)).
250. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2448 (U.S. 2014).
251. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015).
252. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) (stating: “We believe it
fundamental that a section of a statute should not be read in isolation from the context
of the whole Act, and that in fulfilling our responsibility in interpreting legislation, we
must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but should look to
the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy”).
253. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 815 n.6 (1994).
254. This should be particularly true for CERCLA cases, which have historically
been understood to fall under the long-established canon that “remedial statutes are to
be liberally construed,” Michael Sinclair, TRADITIONAL TOOLS OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 96 (2013). However, plaintiffs should not unduly rely on this longestablished canon, as discussed infra in the text accompanying note 277.
255. A&PLH, supra note 54, CERCLA-LH 2, at 1979 WL 211356 (Westlaw)
(Communication From The President Of The United States Transmitting A Draft Of
Proposed Legislation To Amend The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, As
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envisioned as an amendment to RCRA and the Clean Water
Act.256 In the ensuing year, the House considered, but did not
pass, several related bills.257 The stalemate ended shortly after
the 1980 elections when the Republicans won control of the
presidency and the Senate from the Democrats, and the “bill
which became CERCLA passed the Senate on November 24,
1980, after only a few days of debate.”258 The Senate bill that
would become CERCLA was a complete rewrite of (although
presented as an amendment to) House Bill 7020.259 The
compromise bill “was hurriedly put together by a bipartisan
leadership group of senators”260 during the waning days of the
lame duck Congress. The House subsequently passed the
Senate bill with “very limited debate, under a suspension of
the rules, in a situation which allowed for no amendments.”261
The Senate offered the bill to the House “on a take it-or-leave
it basis,”262 with only forty minutes allotted for debate, much of
which was taken by the bill’s sponsors.263 As such, CERCLA’s
legislative history is relatively sparse. The information that is
in the record, however, confirms Congress’ intent to pass “a
Amended, And The Solid Waste Disposal Act, As Amended, To Provide A System Of
Response, Liability, And Compensation For Releases Of Oil, Hazardous Substances,
And Hazardous Wastes, To Establish A Response And Liability Fund, And For Other
Purposes (June 13, 1979)).
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., H.R. 5790, the putative “Hazardous Waste Response Fund Act of
1979,” A&PLH, supra note 56, CERCLA-LH 38, at 1979 WL 211371 (Westlaw); and S.
1480, A&PLH, supra note 56, CERCLA-LH 65, 1979 WL 211383 (a bill to “provide for
liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous substances
released into the environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal
sites”).
258. Peter J. McGrath Jr., Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., et al. v.
United States: Defining Environmental Law or Changing It?, 3 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 85,
85 n.2 (2011).
259. Alfred R. Light, Clean Up of a Legislative Disaster: Avoiding the Constitution
Under the Original CERCLA, 37 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 197, 199 (2014)
(describing “an entirely different ‘compromise bill’,” which was drafted in a few days,
during which time “no committee or subcommittee hearings, open or closed, were held.
No committee reports or bill drafts were printed. Nothing resembling the usual process
of congressional debate occurred. All discussions and negotiations took place behind
closed doors”).
260. Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability (“Superfund”) Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 1 (1982).
261. Id. at 1.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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good bill which filled a legislative void,”264 and without which
there was “no authority . . . [or] funding to deal with certain
types of hazardous waste spills and hazardous waste dangers
to health and to the environment.”265 As one commentator
noted, “the congressional committees which [sic] worked on the
Superfund legislation were the same committees which [sic]
worked on the 1980 amendments to RCRA,”266 and posited that
“the two legislative enactments are continuous and should be
read in this fashion.”267 The fact that the same congressional
committees amended RCRA and drafted CERCLA, the
statement that CERCLA fills a void, and the accelerated
passage of the bill, combine to suggest that RCRA terms were
adopted for convenience in the rushed drafting session.
Reference to RCRA definitions were not intended to limit the
broad aim of CERCLA, considering there is ample evidence
that CERCLA was intended to fill any void or hole left by
RCRA and other environmental laws regarding previouslycontaminated sites.
While nothing in the legislative history indicates that aerial
emissions as a whole do not fall under the ambit of CERCLA,
the Senate compromise bill did expressly limit “the liability of
vessels, trucks, trains and aircraft.”268 This concession was
deemed necessary to ensure passage of the bill, but, as
discussed above, also tends to indicate that other (particularly
stationary) aerial hazardous substance releases were intended
to give rise to liability, just like any other release of hazardous
substances.269 Indeed, during debate of a predecessor Senate
bill, the bill was described as a response to “staggering losses
to our Nation and to our economy from toxic poisons, whether
the medium involved was the air, surface waters, or ground
waters. The sources of these toxins included industrial
accidents, intentional releases through smokestacks and
discharge pipes, and seeps from abandoned dumps.”270
264. Id. at 33.
265. J.P. Sean Maloney, A Legislative History of Liability Under CERCLA, 16 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 517, 538–39 (1992).
266. Grad, supra at 35.
267. Id.
268. Maloney, supra note 260, at 533.
269. Id. at 537.
270. A&PLH, supra note 56, CERCLA-LH 84, at 1980 WL 356067 (Westlaw)
(Proceedings and Debates of the 96th Cong., 2d Sess., July 25, 1980).
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The Senate rewrote House Bill 7020 in part because the
House bill was “too narrow because it dealt only with
abandoned hazardous waste sites.”271 The Senate bill,
conversely “provides authority to respond to more kinds of
releases than the House passed version,”272 and “did address
the broader problem of hazardous waste spills generally.”273
The Senate compromise bill “added response authority for
hazardous substances which are not hazardous wastes . . .
[and] in doing this the Senate had expanded the scope of H.R.
7020.”274 Thus, CERCLA was concerned with more than simply
disposal sites covered by RCRA. Any disposal limitation in
RCRA, therefore, should be loosely interpreted in the CERCLA
context, in light of the clear congressional intent to address
sites contaminated by hazardous substances.
Finally, “it was the intent of the bill that the federal
government’s cleanup and containment capability be viewed as
something of an appeal of last resort, in the absence of any
other adequate and timely response”275 under other existing
laws. The bill therefore was aimed at “assuring that those
responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or injury
from chemical poisons bear the costs of their actions . . . [and]
providing ample Federal response authority to help clean up
hazardous chemical disasters.”276 The very purpose of
CERCLA was to fill in the holes in then-existing
environmental law, providing authority for federal action and
ensuring that polluters pay. Absent clear congressional intent,
a new hole in coverage should not be read into our
environmental laws to allow the unmitigated contamination of
sites via the air pathway and allow polluters to shirk their
responsibility.
IV. CONCLUSION
Hundreds of smelters like Teck’s, and an unknown number
of other industrial facilities, have discharged toxic industrial

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Grad, supra at 22.
Maloney, supra note 265, at 537.
Grad, supra at 22.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 8.
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pollutants into the air in a manner that contaminated
downwind sites. Congress enacted CERCLA to fill just such a
hole in coverage left by other major federal environmental
laws, to enable governments and innocent parties to remediate
contaminated sites, and to make sure that the polluters pay.
Reading an atextual hole in coverage into CERCLA that would
allow polluters to evade responsibility for their actions would
thwart the will of Congress and leave the rest of us holding the
bill.
Absent clear indication of Congressional intent to the
contrary, our environmental statutes must be interpreted in a
manner that is consistent with their terms and overall
structure, and achieves their goals. Congress enacted the
Clean Air Act to address the problem of ambient air pollution,
not to address—and certainly not to thwart—efforts to respond
to the serious problem of sites contaminated by hazardous
substances. Congress enacted CERCLA to ensure prompt
response to clean up contaminated sites and ensure that the
responsible parties pay for the required remediation. Allowing
a company to escape liability, when it discharges toxic
industrial contaminants into the air that later deposit onto and
contaminate land or water, is in direct contradiction of the
legislative intent in enacting CERCLA and does not conform to
its provisions. Until recently, PRPs never raised such a claim
in court, and CERCLA has properly addressed many such
sites. Many more similar sites continue to threaten human
health and the environment, and a new hole in coverage
should not be opened up to thwart federal response authority
under CERCLA. In Pakootas II, the Ninth Circuit should give
effect to CERCLA’s plain meaning, its overall structure, and
the congressional intent to provide the means to clean up
contaminated sites and ensure that the polluters pay.
Finally, Plaintiffs in Pakootas II should recognize that some
recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that some members of
the Court may be willing to consider scaling CERCLA back.
Therefore, Plaintiffs should take care to frame their arguments
within the four corners of the statute and the plain meaning of
the statutory terms. For example, Justice Kennedy recently
penned an opinion for the Court expressing distaste for the
“proposition that remedial statutes should be interpreted in a

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol6/iss1/7

42

Cioffi: Filling Holes in the Air: Why the Ninth Circuit in <i>Pakootas v.

70

WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 6:1

liberal manner,”277 even though that proposition was well
established during the first thirty years of CERCLA
jurisprudence. The Court went on to find the lower court “in
error when it treated this [proposition] as a substitute for a
conclusion grounded in the statute’s text and structure.”278
Similarly, the Court recently warned that CERCLA “liability
may not extend beyond the limits of the statute itself.”279 In
this case, there is ample support in the statute and in the
common meaning of its terms to support CERCLA liability for
persons that purposefully discharge hazardous substances into
the air through industrial stacks, when those hazardous
substances settle on and contaminate a site, threatening
human health and the environment.

277. CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2185 (2014).
278. Id.
279. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. 599, 609 (2009).
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